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Abstract
We present a family of replay attacks against sharded dis-
tributed ledgers, that target cross-shard consensus protocols,
such as the recently proposed Chainspace and Omniledger.
They allow an attacker, with network access only, to double-
spend or lock resources with minimal efforts. The attacker
can act independently without colluding with any nodes, and
succeed even if all nodes are honest; most of the attacks
can also exhibit themselves as faults under periods of asyn-
chrony. These attacks are effective against both shard-led
and client-led cross-shard consensus approaches. Finally, we
present Byzcuit—a new cross-shard consensus protocol that
is immune to those attacks. We implement a prototype of
Byzcuit and evaluate it on a real cloud-based testbed, show-
ing that our defenses impact performance minimally, and
overall performance surpasses previous works.
1 Introduction
Sharding is one the key approaches to address blockchain
scalability issues [2], and a growing number of systems are
implementing sharded blockchains [1, 9, 7, 14, 10, 2]. The
key idea is to create groups (or shards) of nodes that han-
dle only a subset of all transactions and system state, relying
on classical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) protocols for
reaching intra-shard consensus. These systems achieve opti-
mal performance and scalability because: (i) non-conflicting
transactions can be processed in parallel by multiple shards;
and (ii) the system can scale up by adding new shards. How-
ever, this separation of transaction handling across shards
is not perfectly ‘clean’—a transaction might rely on data
managed by multiple shards, requiring an additional step of
cross-shard consensus across the concerned shards. Typ-
ically, an atomic commit protocol (such as the two-phase
commit protocol [8]) is run across all the concerned shards
to ensure that the transaction is accepted by all or none of
those shards.
In this paper, we present the first replay attacks on cross-
shard consensus in sharded blockchains. An attacker can
launch these attacks with minimal effort, without subvert-
ing any nodes, and assuming a weakly synchronous net-
work (and in some cases, without relying on any network
assumption)—even when the byzantine safety assumptions
are satisfied. These attacks compromise key system proper-
ties of safety and liveness, effectively enabling the attacker
to double-spend coins (or any other objects managed by the
blockchain) and create coins out of thin air. Our attacks ap-
ply to the two main approaches to achieve cross-shard con-
sensus [2]: (i) shard-led protocols that only involve the con-
cerned shards, and require no external entity for coordination
(Section 4); and (ii) client-led protocols that are coordinated
by the client (Section 5).
We concretely sketch the replay attacks in the context of
two representative systems: Chainspace [1] as an example
of shard-led protocols; and Omniledger [9] as an example of
client-led protocols. Not only those systems were recently
presented at top security conferences, but they form the ba-
sis of numerous start-ups and open-source projects such as
chainspace.io1 and Harmony2. However, the attacks are
generic and apply to other systems that are based on similar
models, like RapidChain [14]. We also provide a compari-
son with mutex-based cross-shard consensus protocols used
by Ethereum [13] in Appendix A. For each of the two cross-
shard consensus approaches, Appendix B describes how an
attacker can actively stage the attack by eliciting from the
system the messages to replay (in contrast to passively ob-
serving the network traffic, and waiting to detect and record
the target messages). We also discuss the feasibility of these
attacks and their real-world impact.
Drawing insights from our analysis of performance trade-
offs and replay attack vulnerabilities in existing shard-led
and client-led cross-shard consensus protocols, we present
a hybrid system, Byzcuit (Section 6). It combines useful
features from both these design approaches to achieve high
performance and scalability, and is immune to replay at-
1https://chainspace.io
2https://harmony.one
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tacks. Byzcuit employs a Transaction Manager to coordi-
nate cross-shard communication, reducing its cost to O(n)
communication, between n shards, in the absence of faults.
We implement a prototype of Byzcuit in Java as a fork of
the Chainspace code [1], and release it as an open-source
project.3 We evaluate Byzcuit on a real cloud-based testbed
under varying transaction loads and show that Byzcuit has a
client-perceived latency of less than a second, even for a sys-
tem load of 1000 transactions per second (tps). Byzcuit’s
transaction throughput scales linearly with the number of
shards by 250–300 tps for each shard added, handling up to
1550 tps with 10 shards—which is about 8 times higher than
Chainspace with a similar setup. We quantify the overhead
of our replay defenses and find that as expected those reduce
the throughput by 20–250 tps.
Contributions. We make the following key contributions:
we (i) develop the first replay attacks against shard-led
and client-led cross-shard consensus protocols, and illustrate
their impact on important academic and implemented de-
signs; and (ii) design a hybrid, new system Byzcuit with im-
proved performance trade-offs, and which is resilient against
the replay attacks; finally, (iii) we implement a prototype of
Byzcuit and evaluate its performance and scalability on a real
distributed set of nodes and under varying transaction loads,
and illustrate how it is superior to previous proposals.
2 Background and Related Work
We present background and related work on cross-shard con-
sensus protocols.
Sharded blockchains. Earlier systems like Bitcoin [12]
probabilistically elect a single node which can extend the
blockchain. However, such systems assume synchrony, have
no finality (i.e., forks can exist and be eventually accepted)
and low performance (i.e., high latency and low throughput).
Consequently, there has been a shift to committee-based de-
signs [2] where a group of nodes collectively extends the
blockchain typically via classical byzantine fault tolerance
(BFT) consensus protocols such as PBFT [5]. While these
systems offer better performance, single-committee consen-
sus is not scalable—as every node handles every transaction,
adding more nodes to the committee decreases throughput
due to the increased communication overhead.
This motivated the design of sharded systems, where mul-
tiple committees handle a subset of all the transactions—
allowing parallel execution of transactions. Every committee
has its own blockchain and set of objects (or unspent trans-
action outputs, UTXO) that they manage. Committees run
an intra-shard consensus protocol (e.g., PBFT) within them-
selves, and extend the blockchain in parallel.
3URL omitted for double blind review.
Cross-shard consensus. In sharded systems, some trans-
actions may operate on objects handled by different shards,
effectively requiring the relevant shards to additionally run a
cross-shard consensus protocol to enable agreement across
the shards. Specifically, if any of the shards relevant to the
transaction rejects it, all the other shards should likewise re-
ject the transaction to ensure atomicity.
The typical choice for implementing cross-shard consen-
sus is the two-phase atomic commit protocol [8]. This pro-
tocol has two phases which are run by a coordinator. In the
first voting phase, the nodes tentatively write changes locally,
lock resources, and report their status to the coordinator. If
the coordinator does not receive status message from a node
(e.g., because the node crashed or the status message was
lost), it assumes that the node’s local write failed and sends a
rollback message to all the nodes to ensure any local changes
are reversed, and locks released. If the coordinator receives
status messages from all the nodes, it initiates the second
commit phase and sends a commit message to all the nodes
so they can permanently write the changes and unlock re-
sources. In the context of sharded blockchains, the atomic
commit protocol operates on shards (which make the local
changes associated with the voting phase via an intra-shard
consensus protocol like PBFT), rather than individual nodes.
A further consideration is who assumes the role of the coor-
dinator.
Related Work. Replay attacks in general have seen exten-
sive study in the security literature. This is the first paper that
presents replay attacks on cross-shard consensus protocols.
Traditionally, the most stringent threat models assumed by
consensus protocols involve byzantine adversaries who are
able to control or subvert consensus nodes and cause them
to behave arbitrarily. Repurposing those protocols to open
permissionless networks (e.g., blockchains) opens up new at-
tack avenues such as replay attacks as shown in this paper.
There are currently two key approaches to cross-shard con-
sensus [2]. The first approach involves client-led protocols
(such as Omniledger [9] and RSCoin [7]), where the client
acts as a coordinator. These protocols assume that clients are
incentivized to proceed to the unlock phase. While such in-
centives may exist in a cryptocurrency application where an
unresponsive client loses its own coins if the inputs are per-
manently locked, these do not however hold for a general-
purpose platform where transaction inputs may have shared
ownership. The second approach involves shard-led pro-
tocols (such as Chainspace [1], Rapidchain [14] and Elas-
tico [10]), where shards collectively assume the role of a co-
ordinator. All the concerned shards collaboratively run the
protocol between them. This is achieved by making the en-
tire shard act as a ‘resource manager’ for the transactions it
handles. We describe our replay attacks in the context of
two representative systems: Chainspace [1] as an example of
shard-led protocols (Section 4); and Omniledger [9] as an ex-
ample of client-led protocols (Section 5). We provide a more
2
detailed description of these systems in the relevant sections.
3 Attack Overview
Sections 4 and 5 discuss replay attacks on both shard-led
and client-led cross-shard consensus protocols, respectively.
We provide a high-level description of these attacks and the
threat model, and describe the notation we use.
Replay Attacks on Cross-Shard Consensus. The attacker
records a target shard’s responses to the atomic commit pro-
tocol, and replays them during another instance of the pro-
tocol. We present two families of replay attacks: (i) attacks
against the first phase (voting), and (ii) attacks against the
second phase (commit) of the atomic commit protocol.
To attack the first voting phase of the atomic commit pro-
tocol, the attacker replaces messages generated by the target
shard by replaying pre-recorded messages. In practice, the
attacker does not replace those messages—it achieves a sim-
ilar result by making its replayed messages arrive at the co-
ordinator faster (racing the target shard’s original message),
exploiting the fact that the coordinator makes progress based
on the first message it receives. Replaying messages in this
fashion enables the attacker to compromise the system safety
(by creating inconsistent state on the shards) and/or liveness
(by causing valid transactions to be rejected).
To attack the second commit phase of the atomic commit
protocol, the attacker simply replays prerecorded messages
to target shards, and compromises consistency. The attacker
can replay those messages at any time of its choice, and does
not rely on any racing condition as in the previous case.
Threat Model. The attacker can successfully launch the de-
scribed attacks without colluding with any shard nodes, and
under the BFT honest majority safety assumption for nodes
within shards (i.e., the attacks are effective even if all nodes
are honest). We assume an attacker that can observe and
record messages generated by shards. The attacker can be an
external observer that passively collects the target messages
at the level of the network, or it can act as a client and ac-
tively interact with the system to elicit the target messages.
The attacks against the first phase of the atomic commit pro-
tocol (Sections 4.3 and 5.3) assume a weakly synchronous
network in which an attacker may delay messages and race
target shards by replaying pre-recorded messages. The at-
tacks against the second phase of the atomic commit proto-
col (Section 4.4 and 5.4) do not make any such assumptions
on the underlying network.
Notation. Operations on the blockchain are specified as
transactions. A transaction defines some transformation on
the blockchain state, and has input and output objects (such
as UTXO entries). An object is some data managed by the
blockchain, such as a bank account, a specific coin, or a ho-
tel room. For example, T (x1,x2)→ (y1,y2,y3) represents a
transaction with two inputs, x1 managed by shard 1 and x2
BFT
BFT
BFT
BFT
accept(T)
pre-accept(T)
pre-accept(T)
BFT
client
shard 1
shard 2
shard 3
Figure 1: An example execution of S-BAC for a valid transaction
T (x1,x2)→ (y1,y2,y3) with two inputs (x1 and x2, both are active) and three
outputs (y1,y2,y3), where the final decision is accept(T ).
managed by shard 2; and three outputs, y1 managed by shard
1, y2 managed by shard 2, and y3 managed by shard 3. We
call the shards that manages the input objects input shards,
and the shards that manage the output objects output shards.
It is possible for a shard to be both the input and output shard.
Objects can be in two states: active (on unspent) objects are
available for being processed by a transaction; and inactive
(or spent) objects cannot be processed by any transaction.
Additionally, some systems also associate locked state with
objects that are currently being processed by a transaction
to protect against manipulation by other concurrent transac-
tions involving those objects. The attacks we describe in this
paper generalise to transactions with k inputs and k′ outputs
managed by an arbitrary number of shards.
4 Shard-led Cross-Shard Consensus Protocol
In shard-led cross-shard consensus protocols, the shards col-
lectively take on the role of the coordinator in the atomic
commit protocol. We describe replay attacks on shard-
led cross-shard consensus protocols. To make the discus-
sion concrete, we illustrate these attacks in the context of
Chainspace [1] (Section 4.1), though we note that these at-
tacks can be generalized to other similar systems. We dis-
cuss how the attacker can record shard messages to replay
in future attacks (Section 4.2). In Sections 4.3 and 4.4, we
describe replay attacks on the first and second phase of the
cross-shard consensus protocol, followed by a discussion on
the real-world impact of these attacks (Section 4.5).
4.1 Chainspace Overview
Chainspace uses a shard-led cross-shard consensus protocol
called S-BAC. The client submits a transaction to the in-
put shards. Each shard internally runs a BFT protocol to
tentatively decide whether to accept or abort the transac-
tion locally, and broadcasts its local decision (pre-accept(T )
or pre-abort(T )) to other relevant shards. Figure 2 shows
the state machine representing the life cycle of objects in
Chainspace. A shard generates pre-abort(T ) if the trans-
3
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locked 
T 
inactive
pre-abort(T)
pre-accept(T)
abort(T)
accept(T') accept(T)
pre-accept(T'')
or
pre-abort(T'')
Figure 2: State machine representing the life cycle of Chainspace objects.
An object becomes ‘active’ as a result of a previous successful transaction.
The object state changes to ‘locked’ if a shard locally emits pre-accept(T )
in the first phase of the cross-shard consensus protocol for a transaction T .
A locked object cannot be processed by other transactions T ′′. If the second
phase of the protocol results in accept(T ), the object becomes ‘inactive’;
alternatively, if the result is abort(T ) the object becomes ‘active’ again and
is available for being processed by other transactions.
action fails local checks (e.g., if any of the input objects are
‘inactive’ or ‘locked’). If a shard generates pre-accept(T ),
it changes the state of the input objects to ‘locked’. This is
the first step of S-BAC, and is equivalent to the voting phase
in the two-phase atomic commit protocol (Section 2).
Each shard collects responses from other relevant shards,
and commits the transaction if all shards respond with pre-
accept(T ), or aborts the transaction otherwise. This is the
second step of S-BAC, and is equivalent to the commit phase
in the two-phase atomic commit protocol (Section 2). The
shards communicate this decision to the client as well as the
output shards by sending them the accept(T ) or abort(T )
messages. If the shard’s decision is accept(T ), it changes
the input object state to ‘inactive’. If the shard’s decision is
abort(T ), it changes the input object state to ‘active’ (effec-
tively unlocking it). Upon reception of the accept(T ), the
client concludes that the transaction was committed, and the
output shard creates the output objects (with the state ‘ac-
tive’) of the transaction.
Figure 1 shows an example execution of S-BAC for a valid
transaction T (x1,x2)→ (y1,y2,y3) with two inputs (x1 and
x2, both are active) and three outputs (y1,y2,y3), where the
final decision is accept(T ). The client submits T to shard 1
and shard 2. Upon reception of T , both shard 1 and shard 2
confirm that the transaction is well-formed and the inputs ob-
jects are active, and emit pre-accept(T ) at the end of the first
phase of S-BAC. Each shard receives pre-accept(T ) from
the other shard, and emits accept(T ) at the end of the sec-
ond phase of S-BAC. As a result, the input objects x1 and
x2 become inactive, and the output shards respectively create
objects y1, y2, and y3.
4.2 Message Recording
Prior to the replay attacks, the attacker records responses
generated by shards. The attacker can record shard responses
in the first phase of S-BAC (i.e., pre-accept(T ) or pre-
abort(T )), enabling the family of attacks described in Sec-
tion 4.3. The attacker can also record shard responses in the
BFT
BFT
BFT
BFT
accept(T)
pre-abort(T)
pre-accept(T)
BFT
client
shard 1
shard 2
shard 3
attacker
pre-accept(T)
abort(T)
Figure 3: Illustration of the replay attack depicted in row 6 of Table 1. The
attacker replays to shard 2 a prerecorded pre-accept(T ) message (shown as
a bold line) from shard 1, which precludes shard 1’s pre-abort(T ) message
(shown as a dotted line).
second phase of S-BAC (i.e., accept(T ) or abort(T )), en-
abling the family of attacks described in Section 4.4.
In the general case, the attacker passively collects the mes-
sages either by sniffing the network on protocol executions,
or by downloading the blockchain and selecting the mes-
sages to replay4. Appendix B.1 shows how the attacker can
act as (or collude with) a client to actively elicit the messages
necessary for the attacks, to record and later replay—this em-
powers the attacker to actively orchestrate the attacks.
4.3 Attacks on the First Phase of S-BAC
We present replay attacks on the first phase of S-BAC by
taking the example of a transaction T (x1,x2)→ (y1,y2,y3)
as described in Section 3. These attacks easily generalize to
transactions with k inputs and k′ outputs managed by an arbi-
trary number of shards. The replay attacks work in two steps;
(i) the attacker records pre-accept(T ) or pre-abort(T ) mes-
sages (as described in Section 4.2 and Appendix B.1); and
(ii) then replays those messages.
Table 1 shows the replay attacks that the attacker can
launch, for all possible combinations of messages emitted
by shard 1 and shard 2 in the first phase of S-BAC. The cap-
tion includes details about how to interpret this table. All
attacks exploit the parallel composition of multiple S-BAC
instances, and insufficient binding of messages to its S-BAC
instance. We describe row 6 of Table 1, to help readers in-
terpret rest of the table on their own. In the correct execution
(row 5), shard 1 and shard 2 emit pre-abort(T ) (because x1
is not active) and pre-accept(T ) in the first phase, respec-
tively. In the second phase, both shards emit abort(T ) and
the protocol terminates. Figure 3 illustrates the replay attack
corresponding to row 6 of Table 1. The attacker races shard 1
by sending to shard 2 the prerecorded pre-accept(T ) mes-
sage from shard 1. As a result, shard 2 emits accept(T ),
4Since those messages need to be recorded on chain for verification, just
using transport layer encryption between nodes is not effective.
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Phase 1 of S-BAC Phase 2 of S-BAC
(potential victim)
Shard 1
(potential victim)
Shard 2
(potential victim)
Shard 1
(potential victim)
Shard 2
(potential victim)
Shard 3
1 lock x1
pre-accept(T )
lock x2
pre-accept(T )
create y1; inactivate x1
accept(T )
create y2; inactivate x2
accept(T )
create y3
-
2 Bpre-abort(T ) create y1; inactivate x1
accept(T )
unlock x2
abort(T )
create y3
-
3 Bpre-abort(T ) unlock x1
abort(T )
create y2; inactivate x2
accept(T )
create y3
-
4 Bpre-abort(T ) Bpre-abort(T ) unlock x1
abort(T )
unlock x2
abort(T ) -
5 -
pre-abort(T )
lock x2
pre-accept(T )
-
abort(T )
unlock x2
abort(T ) -
6 Bpre-accept(T ) -
abort(T )
create y2; inactivate x2
accept(T )
create y3
-
7 lock x1
pre-accept(T )
-
pre-abort(T )
unlock x1
abort(T )
-
abort(T ) -
8 B pre-accept(T ) create y1; inactivate x1
accept(T )
-
abort(T )
create y3
-
9 -
pre-abort(T )
-
pre-abort(T )
-
abort(T )
-
abort(T ) -
Table 1: List of replay attacks against the first phase of S-BAC for all possible executions of the transaction T (x1,x2)→ (y1,y2,y3) as described in Section 3.
The highlighted rows indicate correct executions of S-BAC (i.e., without the attacker), and the other rows indicate incorrect executions due to the replay attacks.
In multirows, the top sub-rows show the protocol messages emitted by shards, and the bottom sub-rows indicate local shard actions as a result of emitting those
messages. For example, (column 3, row 2) means that shard 1 emits accept(T ) (top sub-row), and creates a new object y1 and inactivates x1 (bottom sub-row).
The first two columns indicate the messages emitted by each shard at the end the first phase of S-BAC. The attacker races shards at the end of the first phase of
S-BAC by replaying prerecorded messages, marked with the symbol B in the first two columns of Table 1. For example Bpre-abort(T ) at (column 1, row 2)
means that the attacker sends to other relevant shards (in this case shard 2) a prerecorded pre-abort(T ) message impersonating shard 1 that races the original
pre-accept(T ) (column 1, row 1) emitted by shard 1. The last three columns indicate the messages emitted at the end of the second phase of S-BAC.
inactivates object x2 and creates object y2. This leads to in-
consistent state across the shards. In a correct execution: (i)
if T is accepted all its inputs (x1 and x2) should become inac-
tive, and all the outputs (y1, y2, y3) should be created; and (ii)
if T is aborted, all its inputs (x1 and x2) should become active
again, and none of the outputs (y1, y2, y3) should be created.
However, here we have an incorrect termination of S-BAC:
at the end of the protocol x1 is active and x2 is inactive; y1 is
not created, y2 and y3 are created.
Table 1 shows that through careful selection of the mes-
sages to replay from different S-BAC instances, the attacks
can be effective against any shard. All the attacks (except
row 4) compromise consistency; the attacker can trick the in-
put shards to inactivate arbitrary objects, and trick the output
shards into creating new objects in violation of the protocol.
The attack depicted in row 4 only affects availability.
4.4 Attacks on the Second Phase of S-BAC
We present replay attacks on the second phase of S-BAC.
The attacker prerecords accept(T ) messages as described in
Section 4.2 and Appendix B.1.
Table 2 shows replay attacks for all possible combinations
of messages emitted by shard 1 and shard 2 in the second
phase. Since the attacks we describe in this section assume
that the first phase of S-BAC concluded correctly (i.e., all
the relevant shards unanimously decide to accept or reject a
transaction), both the shards generate abort(T ) (row 1) or
accept(T ) (row 5). The caption includes details about how
to interpret this table. We describe row 6 of Table 2, to help
readers interpret rest of the table on their own. In the cor-
rect execution (row 5), both the shards emit abort(T ) and
no output objects are created. In the attack in row 6, the at-
tacker replays a prerecorded accept(T ) from shard 1 to all
the relevant shards (in this case shard 3). Upon receiving this
message, shard 3 (incorrectly) creates y3.
The potential victims of replay attacks corresponding to
the second phase of S-BAC are the shards that only act as out-
put shards (i.e., do not simultaneously act as input shards).
The attacker can replay accept(T ) multiple times tricking
shard 3 into creating y3 multiple times. These attacks are
possible because shards do not keep records of inactive ob-
jects (following the UTXO model) for scalability reasons5,
5Requiring shards to remember the full history of inactive objects would
increase their memory requirements monotonically over time, reaching at
some point memory limits preventing further operations. Thus this is a poor
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Phase 2 of S-BAC
Shard 1 Shard 2
Shard 3
(potential victim)
1 create y1; inactivate x1
accept(T )
create y2; inactivate x2
accept(T )
create y3
-
2 Baccept(T ) create y3
3 Baccept(T ) create y3
4 Baccept(T ) Baccept(T ) create y3
5 (unlock x1)
abort(T )
(unlock x2)
abort(T )
-
-
6 Baccept(T ) create y3
7 Baccept(T ) create y3
8 Baccept(T ) Baccept(T ) create y3
Table 2: List of replay attacks against the second phase of S-BAC for all possible executions of the transaction T (x1,x2)→ (y1,y2,y3) as described in
Section 3. The highlighted rows indicate correct executions of S-BAC (i.e., without the attacker), and the other rows indicate incorrect executions due to the
replay attacks. In multirows, the top sub-rows show the protocol messages emitted by shards, and the bottom sub-rows indicate local shard actions as a result
of emitting those messages. For example, (column 1, row 1) means that shard 1 emits accept(T ) (top sub-row), and creates a new object y1 and inactivates
x1 (bottom sub-row). The first two columns indicate the messages emitted by each shard at the end the second phase of S-BAC, and the last column shows the
effect of these messages on the output shard 3. Replayed messages are marked with the symbol B. For example Baccept(T ) at (column 1, row 2) means that
the attacker sends to other relevant shards (in this case shard 3) a prerecorded accept(T ) message impersonating shard 1.
and because shard 3 takes part in only the second phase of
S-BAC. The attacker can double-spend y3 repeatedly by re-
playing a single prerecorded message multiple times, and
spending the object (and effectively purging it from shard
3’s UTXO) before each replay.
Contrarily to the attacks against the first phase of S-BAC
(Section 4.3), these attacks do not rely on any racing condi-
tions; there is no need to race any honest messages.
4.5 Real-world Impact
The real-world impact and attacker incentives to conduct
these attacks depends on the nature and implementation of
the smart contract handling the target objects. We discuss
the impact of these attacks in the context of two common
smart contract applications, which are also described in the
Chainspace paper [1]. To take a concrete example, we il-
lustrate the attack depicted in row 3 of Table 1, but similar
results can be obtained with the other attacks described in
Table 1 and Table 2.
One of the most common blockchain application is to
manage cryptocurrency (or coins) and enable payments for
processing transactions, implemented by the CSCoin smart
contract in Chainspace. Lets suppose object x1 (handled by
shard 1) represents Alice’s account, and object x2 (handled
by shard 2) represents Bob’s account. To transfer v coins to
Bob, Alice submits a transaction T (x1,x2)→ (y1,y2), where
y1 and y2 respectively represent the new account objects of
Alice and Bob, with updated account balances. By executing
the attack described in row 3 of Table 1, an attacker can trick
shard 1 to abort the transaction and unlock x1 (thus reestab-
lishing Alice’s account balance as it was prior to the coin
transfer), and shard 2 to accept the transaction and create
mitigation for the attacks presented.
y2 (thus adding v coins to Bob’s account). This attack ef-
fectively allows any attacker to double-spend coins on the
ledger; and shows how to create v coins out of thin air.
Another common blockchain use case is a platform for de-
cision making (or electronic petitions), implemented by the
SVote smart contract in Chainspace. Upon initialization, the
SVote contract creates two objects: (i) x1 representing the
tally’s public key, a list of all voters’ public keys, and the
tally’s signature on these; and (ii) x2 representing a vote ob-
ject at the initial stage of the election (all candidates having
a score of zero) along with a zero-knowledge proof asserting
the correctness of the initial stage. To vote, clients submit a
transaction T (x1,x2)→ (y1,y2), where y1 and y2 are respec-
tively the updated voting list (i.e., the voting list without the
client’s public key), and the election stage updated with the
client’s vote. By executing the attack described by row 3 of
Table 1, an attacker can trick shard 1 to abort the transac-
tion and thus not update the voting list, and shard 2 to ac-
cept the transaction and thus update the election stage. This
effectively allows any client to vote multiple times during
an election while remaining undetected (due to the privacy-
preserving properties of the smart contract).
5 Client-led Cross-shard Consensus Protocol
We describe replay attacks on client-led cross-shard consen-
sus protocols. We illustrate these attacks in the context of
Omniledger [9] (Section 5.1) to make the discussion con-
crete. However, we note that these attacks can be general-
ized to other similar systems. We discuss how the attacker
can record shard messages to replay in future attacks (Sec-
tion 5.2). In Sections 5.3 and 5.4, we describe replay attacks
on the first and second phase of the cross-shard consensus
protocol. Finally, we discuss the real-world impact of these
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Figure 4: An example execution of Atomix for a valid transaction
T (x1,x2)→ (y1,y2,y3) with two inputs (x1 and x2, both are active) and three
outputs (y1,y2,y3), where the final decision is accept(T ).
attacks (Section 5.5).
5.1 Omniledger Overview
Omniledger uses a client-led cross-shard consensus protocol
called Atomix. The client submits the transaction T to the
input shards. Each shard runs a BFT protocol locally to de-
cide whether to accept or reject the transaction, and commu-
nicates its response (pre-accept(T ) or pre-abort(T )) to the
client.6 A shard emits pre-abort(T ) if the transaction fails
local checks. Alternatively, if a shard emits pre-accept(T ),
it inactivates the input objects it manages. This is the first
phase of Atomix, and is similar to the voting phase in the
two-phase atomic commit protocol (Section 2), but differs in
that the protocol proceeds optimistically. The write changes
made by the input shards in the first phase of Atomix are con-
sidered permanent (i.e., there is no ‘locked’ object state), un-
less the client requests the input shards to revert their changes
in the second phase.
After the client has collected pre-accept(T ) from all in-
put shards, it submits accept(T ) message (containing proof
of the pre-accept(T ) messages) to the output shards which
create the output objects. Alternatively, if any of the input
shards emits pre-abort(T ), the client sends abort(T ) (con-
taining proof of pre-abort(T )) to the relevant input shards
which make the input objects active again. This is the sec-
ond phase of Atomix, and is similar to the commit phase in
the two-phase atomic commit protocol (Section 2).
Figure 4 shows execution of Atomix for a valid transaction
T (x1,x2)→ (y1,y2,y3), with two active inputs (x1 managed
by shard 1, and x2 managed by shard 2) and producing three
outputs (y1,y2,y3) managed by shard 1, shard 2 and shard 3,
respectively. The client sends T to the input shards, both of
which reply with pre-accept(T ) and make the input objects
x1 and x2 inactive. The client sends accept(T ) to the output
shards which respectively create objects y1, y2, and y3.
6For consistency and clarity, we use the terminology used in Sec-
tion 4. In Omniledger, pre-accept(T ) is actually a proof-of-accept and
pre-abort(T ) is a proof-of-abort [9].
5.2 Message Recording
Before launching the replay attacks, the attacker first records
the target shard responses. The attacker can record shard re-
sponses in the first phase of Atomix (i.e., pre-accept(T ) or
pre-abort(T )), enabling the attacks described in Section 5.3.
The attacker can also record shard responses in the second
phase of Atomix (i.e., accept(T ) or abort(T )), enabling the
attacks described in Section 5.4. In the general case, the at-
tacker passively collects the messages to replay, for example
by protocol executions on the network, or by downloading
the blockchain and selecting the appropriate messages. Ap-
pendix B.2 shows how the attacker can act as (or collude
with) a client to actively elicit and record the target messages
to later use in the replay attacks.
5.3 Attacks on the First Phase of Atomix
We present replay attacks on the first phase of Atomix by
taking the example of a transaction T (x1,x2)→ (y1,y2,y3)
as described in Section 3. These attacks easily generalize
to transactions with k inputs and k′ outputs managed by an
arbitrary number of shards. The replay attacks work in two
steps: (i) the attacker observes the traffic and records pre-
accept(T ) or pre-abort(T ) messages as described in Sec-
tion 5.2; and (ii) then replay those messages.
Table 3 shows the replay attacks that the attacker can
launch, for all possible combinations of responses generated
by shard 1 and shard 2 in the first phase of Atomix. The
caption includes details about how to interpret this table. We
describe row 2 of Table 3, to help readers interpret rest of
the table on their own. In the correct execution (row 1),
both shard 1 and shard 2 emit pre-accept(T ) in the first
phase, and inactivate the input objects x1 and x2. Upon re-
ceiving these messages, the client sends accept(T ) to the
output shards shard 1, shard 2 and shard 3, which create
the output objects y1, y2 and y3, respectively; and the proto-
col terminates. In the attack illustrated in row 2 of Table 3,
the attacker races shard 1 by sending to the client the pre-
recorded pre-abort(T ) message from shard 1. As a result,
the client sends abort(T ) message to the input shards shard
1 and shard 2, which re-activate the input objects x1 and x2.
This results in inconsistent state because the output objects
(y1, y2, y3) have been created, while the input objects (x1, x2)
are still active—in a correct execution all transaction inputs
should be inactivated, and all outputs should be created.
Table 3 shows that through careful selection of the mes-
sages to replay, the attacks can be effective against any shard.
The attacks illustrated in row 2, row 3, and row 4 only affect
availability, while the other attacks compromise consistency
(i.e., the attacker can trick the input shards to reactivate ar-
bitrary objects, and trick the output shards into creating new
objects in violation of the protocol). The potential victims
of these attacks include the client (e.g., when the attacker re-
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Phase 1 of Atomix Phase 2 of Atomix
(potential victim)
Shard 1
(potential victim)
Shard 2
(victim)
Client
(potential victim)
Shard 1
(potential victim)
Shard 2
(potential victim)
Shard 3
1 inactivate x1
pre-accept(T )
inactivate x2
pre-accept(T ) accept(T ) create y1
-
create y2
-
create y3
-
2 B pre-abort(T ) abort(T ) re-activate x1
-
re-activate x2
- -
3 B pre-abort(T ) abort(T ) re-activate x1
-
re-activate x2
- -
4 Bpre-abort(T ) Bpre-abort(T ) abort(T ) re-activate x1
-
re-activate x2
- -
5 -
pre-abort(T )
inactivate x2
pre-accept(T ) abort(T ) -
-
re-activate x2
- -
6 Bpre-accept(T ) accept(T ) create y1
-
create y2
-
create y3
-
7 inactivate x1
pre-accept(T )
-
pre-abort(T ) abort(T ) re-activate x1
-
-
- -
8 B pre-accept(T ) accept(T ) create y1
-
create y2
-
create y3
-
9 -
pre-abort(T )
-
pre-abort(T ) abort(T ) -
-
-
- -
10 B pre-accept(T ) B pre-accept(T ) accept(T ) create y1
-
create y2
-
create y3
-
Table 3: List of replay attacks against the first phase of Atomix for all possible executions of the transaction T (x1,x2)→ (y1,y2,y3) as described in Section 3.
The highlighted rows indicate correct executions of Atomix (i.e., without the attacker), and the other rows indicate incorrect executions due to the replay
attacks. In multirows, the top sub-rows show the protocol messages emitted by shards, and the bottom sub-rows indicate local shard actions as a result of
emitting those messages. For example, (column 1, row 1) means that shard 1 emits pre-accept(T ) (top sub-row), and inactivates x1 (bottom sub-row). The
first two columns indicate the messages emitted by each shard at the end the first phase of Atomix. Replayed messages are marked with the symbol B, for
example Bpre-abort(T ) at (column 1, row 2) means that the attacker sends to the client a prerecorded pre-abort(T ) message impersonating shard 1 that races
the original pre-accept(T ) (column 1, row 1) emitted by shard 1. The third column indicates the messages sent by the client to the relevant shards, and the
last three columns indicate the local actions performed by shards at the end of the second phase of Atomix.
plays the shard messages to it in the first phase of Atomix)
and any input or output shards.
5.4 Attacks on the Second Phase of Atomix
We present replay attacks on the second phase of Atomix.
The attacker prerecords accept(T ) and abort(T ) messages
as described in Section 5.2.
Table 4 shows replay attacks corresponding to the mes-
sages emitted by the client in the second phase—i.e., ac-
cept(T ) in row 1, or abort(T ) in row 3. The caption includes
details about how to interpret this table. The abort(T ) mes-
sage at (column 1, row 2) means that the attacker sends a
prerecorded abort(T ) message to the input shards (shard 1
and shard 2) impersonating the client. Upon receiving this
message, shard 1 and shard 2 (incorrectly) re-activate x1 and
x2, respectively. Furthermore, all output shards create the
output objects when the correct accept(T ) message emitted
by the client (row 1, column 1) reaches them. This results in
inconsistent state, because the output objects have been cre-
ated, but the input objects have not been consumed and have
been reactivated by the abort(T ) message replayed by the
adversary. The potential victims of abort(T ) replay attack
are the input shards.
Similarly, accept(T ) at (row 4, column 1) means that the
attacker sends a prerecorded accept(T ) message to the out-
put shards (shard 1, shard 2 and shard 3) impersonating the
client. Upon receiving this message, the output shards (in-
correctly) create y1, y2 and y3. Furthermore, the input shards
(shard 1 and shard 2) reactivate x1 and x2 upon receiving
the the correct abort(T ) message emitted by the client (row
3, column 1). This creates inconsistent state: the input ob-
jects have not been consumed and have been reactivated by
the abort(T ) message emitted by the client, but the output
objects have been created due to the accept(T ) message re-
played by the attacker. The potential victims of accept(T )
replay attack are the output shards.
These attacks are possible because output shards cre-
ate objects directly upon receiving accept(T ); they do not
check if the objects have been previously invalidated be-
cause shards do not keep records of inactive objects (per
8
Phase 2 of Atomix
Client (potential victim)
Shard 1
(potential victim)
Shard 2
(potential victim)
Shard 3
1 accept(T ) create y1
-
create y2
-
create y3
-
2 Babort(T ) re-activate x1
-
re-activate x2
- -
3 abort(T ) re-activate x1
-
re-activate x2
- -
4 Baccept(T ) create y1
-
create y2
-
create y3
-
Table 4: List of replay attacks against the second phase of Atomix for all possible executions of the transaction T (x1,x2)→ (y1,y2,y3) as described in
Section 3. The highlighted rows indicate correct executions of Atomix (i.e., without the attacker), and the other rows indicate incorrect executions due to the
replay attacks. In multirows, the top sub-rows show the protocol messages emitted by shards, and the bottom sub-rows indicate local shard actions. Note that
we use the multirow format for consistency reasons; in this table the first column indicates the messages emitted by the client at the beginning of the second
phase of Atomix, and the last two column shows the effect of these messages on the relevant shards. Replayed messages are marked with the symbol B. For
example, Babort(T ) at (column 1, row 2) means that the attacker sends a prerecorded abort(T ) message to the input shards impersonating the client.
the UTXO model) for scalability reasons.7 The attacker
can double-spend the output objects repeatedly from a sin-
gle prerecorded message by replaying it multiple times, and
spending the object (and effectively purging it from the out-
put shards’ UTXO) before each replay.
Similar to the attacks against the second phase of S-BAC
(Section 4.4), these attacks do not exploit any racing condi-
tion and can be mounted by an adversary at a leisurely pace.
5.5 Real-world Impact
Contrarily to Chainspace, Omniledger does not support
smart contracts and only handles a cryptocurrency. The at-
tacks described in Sections 5.3 and 5.4 allow an attacker to:
(i) double-spend the coins of any user, by reactivating spent
coins (e.g., the attacker may execute the attack depicted by
row 2 of Table 4 to re-activate the objects x1 and x2 after
the transfer is complete); and (ii) create coins out of thin air
by replaying the message to create coins (e.g., an attacker
may execute the attack depicted by row 4 of Table 4 to cre-
ate multiple times object y3, by purging it from the UTXO
list of shard 3 prior to each instance of the attack). If the at-
tacker colludes with the client, it can trigger the prerecorded
messages needed for the attacks as described in Section 5.2.
Alternatively, the attacker can passively observe the network
and collect the target messages to replay. Similar results can
be obtained using the attacks described in Table 3.
Note that since transaction are recorded on the blockchain,
these attacks can be detected retrospectively. This can lead
to the attacker being exposed, or the attacker can inculpate
innocent users (the attacker can replay messages of any user).
7Verifying that objects have not been previously invalided implies either
keep a forever-growing list of invalidated objects, or download and check
the shard’s entire blockchain.
6 The Byzcuit Atomic Commit Protocol
We previously discussed the two main approaches to achieve
cross-shard consensus in sharded blockchains: shard-led
protocols in the context of S-BAC (Section 4.1), and client-
led protocols in the context of Atomix (Section 5.1). S-BAC
runs the protocol among the shards, without relying on client
coordination. But this comes at the cost of increased cross-
shard communication: all input shards communicate with all
other input shards, which leads to communication complex-
ity of O(n2) where n is the number of input shards.
On the other hand, Atomix is a simpler protocol, and us-
ing the client to coordinate cross-shard communication can
reduce the cost to O(n) in the number of shards (by aggregat-
ing shard messages). However, an unresponsive or malicious
client can permanently lock input objects by never initiating
the second phase of the protocol, requiring additional design
considerations (e.g., a new entity that periodically unlocks
input objects for transactions on which no progress has been
made). Moreover, we have highlighted that both shard-led
(Sections 4.3 and 4.4) and client-led (Sections 5.3 and 5.4)
protocols are vulnerable to replay attacks that can compro-
mise system liveness and safety.
Motivated by these insights, we present Byzcuit—a cross-
shard atomic commit protocol that is based on S-BAC, and
integrates design features from Atomix. Byzcuit allocates a
Transaction Manager (TM) to coordinate cross-shard com-
munication, reducing its cost to O(n) in the happy case8;
alternatively Byzcuit also has a fall-back mode in case the
TM fails, similar to Atomix and traditional two phase com-
mit protocols. Byzcuit achieves resilience against the replays
attacks described in Section 4 and Section 5, by leveraging
the notion of dummy objects and object sequence numbers,
which have been explained in the following subsections.
8The communication complexity can be reduced to O(n) in the number
of shards by aggregating shard messages as described by Omniledger.
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6.1 Byzcuit Protocol Design
We describe the main ingredients of our solution to the re-
play attacks. We observe that the replay attacks described in
Section 4 and Section 5 are possible because of two reasons.
First, the input shards do not have a way to know that par-
ticular protocol messages received correspond to a specific
instance (or session) of a transaction. This gap in the in-
put shards’ knowledge enables an attacker to replay, mix and
match, old messages leading to attacks. To address this limi-
tation, we associate a session identifier with each transaction,
which has to be crafted carefully to not degrade the perfor-
mance of the protocols significantly—such as, for example,
by requiring nodes to store state linearly in the number of
past transactions.
The second reason that facilitates the replay attacks is that
in some cases the output shards are only involved in the sec-
ond phase of the protocol, and therefore have no knowledge
of the transaction context (to determine freshness) that is
available to the input shards. We address this limitation by
introducing the notion of dummy objects: each shard creates
a fixed number of dummy objects upon configuration; if a
shard only serves as an output shard for a transaction (and
therefore will only be involved in the second phase of the
protocol), Byzcuit forces it to be involved in the first phase
of the protocol by implicitly including a dummy object man-
aged by the output shard in the transaction inputs, which will
create a new dummy object upon completion. As a result, the
output shard also becomes an input shard (because of the in-
clusion of its dummy object in the transaction inputs) and
witnesses the entire protocol execution, rather than just the
second phase.
Byzcuit Protocol Execution. We illustrate Byzcuit taking
the example of a transaction T (x1,x2)→ (y1,y2,y3) with two
input objects, x1 managed by shard 1 and x2 managed by
shard 2; and three outputs, y1 managed by shard 1, y2 man-
aged by shard 2, and y3 managed by shard 3.
Figure 5 illustrates the Byzcuit protocol; the client first
sends the transaction to all input and output shards. Note that
this is different than other protocols like S-BAC and Atomix,
where the transaction is only sent to the input shards. As
mentioned previously, to achieve resilience against replay at-
tacks, Byzcuit forces a shard that is only involved in creating
the output objects to also become an input shard (and witness
the transnational context by participating in the first phase of
the protocol) by implicitly consuming one of its dummy in-
puts (which creates a new dummy object upon completion).
Byzcuit associates a sequence number sxi to each object and
dummy object (when the object is created sxi = 0). The se-
quence number is intrinsically linked to the object: when
clients query shards to obtain an object xi, they also receive
the associated sequence number sxi .
When submitting the transaction T , the client also sends
along a transaction sequence number sT = max{sx1 ,sx2 ,sd3},
where the transaction sequence number sT is the maximum
of the sequence numbers sxi of each input object xi and
dummy objects di (Ê).
Upon receiving a new pair (T,sT ), each shard saves (T,sT )
in a local cache memory—the transaction sequence number
sT acts as session identifier associated with the transaction
T . Each shard internally verifies that the transaction passes
local checks, and that sT is equal to (or bigger than) the se-
quence numbers of the objects they manage (i.e., shard 1
checks sT ≥ sx1 , shard 2 checks sT ≥ sx2 , shard 3 checks
sT ≥ sd3 ). The shards send their local decision to the TM:
pre-accept(T,sT ) for local accept (and the shard locks the
objects it manages), or pre-abort(T,sT ) for local abort.
After receiving all the messages corresponding to the first
phase of Byzcuit from the concerned shards, the TM sends a
suitable message to the shards (accept(T,sT ) if all the shards
respond with pre-accept(T,sT ), or abort(T,sT ) otherwise).
Upon receiving accept(T,sT ) or abort(T,sT ) from the TM,
shards first verify that they previously cached the pair (T,sT )
associated with the message; otherwise they ignore it (Ë).
The accept(T,sT ) or abort(T,sT ) messages sent by the
TM provide enough evidence to the shards to verify whether
sT is correctly computed; i.e. shards verify that sT is at least
the maximum of the sequence numbers of each input and
dummy object by inspecting the transaction T signed by each
shard. If accept(T,sT ) has a correct sT , the shards inactivate
the input objects and create the output objects (y1,y2,y3),
and shard 3 creates a new dummy object d˜3; otherwise, they
update the sequence numbers of each input object (sx1 ,sx2)
and dummy object d3 to (sT + 1), i.e. shards locally update
sx1← (sT +1) and sx2← (sT +1), and sd3← (sT +1). Shards
delete (T,sT ) from their local cache (Ì).
Since we assume that shards are honest—inline with the
threat model of the systems discussed—it suffices if only one
shard notifies the client of the protocol outcome; we may set
any arbitrary rule to decide which shard notifies the client
(e.g., the shard handling the first input object) (Í).
Figure 6 shows the finite state machine describing the life
cycle of Byzcuit objects.
Transaction Manager. The Transaction Manager (TM)
coordinates cross-shard communication in Byzcuit. We now
discuss who might play the role of the TM, and argue that
Byzcuit guarantees liveness even if the TM is faulty (byzan-
tine) or crashes.
Keeping with the overall design goal of decentralization,
we envision that a designated shard will act as the TM. If
the shard is honest, the TM is live—and therefore progress
is always made. The input shards contact in turn each node
of the TM shard until they reach one honest node. The TM
shard may have up to f dishonest nodes; therefore, the client
or the input shards need to send messages to at least f + 1
nodes of the TM shard to ensure that it is received by at least
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Figure 5: An example execution of Byzcuit for a valid transaction
T (x1,x2)→ (y1,y2,y3) with two input objects (x1 and x2, both are active),
and three outputs (y1,y2,y3), where the final decision is accept(T,sT ).
one honest node9. Thus, as soon as the first honest node
receives the message, the protocol progresses.
If the TM is the client or any centralized party, it may act
arbitrarily—but this does not stall the protocol because any-
one can make the protocol progress by taking over at any
time the role of the TM. This is possible because the TM
does not act on the basis of any secrets, therefore anyone
else can take over and complete the protocols. This “any-
one” may be an honest node in a shard that wants to finally
unlock an object (e.g., upon a timeout); or other clients that
wish to use a locked object; or it may be an external service
that has a job to periodically close open Byzcuit instances.
Byzcuit ensures such parties may attempt to make progress
asynchronously and concurrently safely. Therefore, Byzcuit
guarantees liveness as long as there is at least one honest en-
tity in the system.
Handling Sequence Number Overflow. An attacker can
try to exhaust the possible sequence numbers to make them
overflow. The attacker submits a pair (T,sT ) such that the
sequence number sT is just below the system overflow value;
the sequence numbers associate with the inputs overflow
upon the next updates, and the system would be again prone
to the attacks described in Section 4.310. To mitigate this is-
sue, shards define a clone procedure allowing to update any
of their objects to an unchanged version of themselves (i.e.
it creates a fresh copy of the object). This clone procedure
effectively creates a new object with serial number s′x = 0.
When shards detect that the serial number of one of their ob-
9Clients may take a statistical view of availability. Given that fewer than
2/3 of nodes in a shard are dishonest, sending the transaction to ρ nodes
will fail to reach an honest node with probability only (1/3)ρ . Clients may
also send messages sequentially to nodes, and only continue if they do not
observe progress within some timeout to further reduce costs.
10Note that this overflow vulnerability is common to every system relying
on nonces chosen by the users, like Byzantine Quorum Systems [11].
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Figure 6: State machine representing the life cycle of objects in Byzcuit.
Objects are initially ‘active’. Upon receiving a transaction that passes lo-
cal checks, a shard changes its input objects’ state to ‘locked’ (objects are
locked for a given transaction T and transaction sequence number sT ) and
emits pre-accept(T,sT ); otherwise it updates the sequence number of ev-
ery object it manages and emits abort(T,sT ). Once a shard locks input ob-
jects for a given (T,sT ), any accept(T,sT ) and abort(T,sT ) with malformed
transaction sequence numbers are ignored, and do not cause any transition
(not included in the figure). Any incoming transaction T ′ that requires pro-
cessing ‘locked’ input object(s) is aborted. Upon receiving accept(T,sT )
with a well formed sT , a shard makes its input objects ‘inactive’ and creates
the output objects. Alternatively, upon receiving abort(T,sT ) shards unlock
their inputs and updates the corresponding sequence numbers.
jects approaches the overflow value, they execute internally
this clone procedure. The attacker may exploit this mecha-
nism to DoS the system, forcing shards to constantly update
their objects; as a result, the target objects are not available
to users. DoS countermeasures are out of scope, and are typ-
ically addressed by introducing transaction fees.
6.2 Security against Replay Attacks
We argue that Byzcuit is resilient to replay attacks. We re-
call the Honest Shard assumption from Chainspace and Om-
niledger under which Byzcuit operates, and assume that mes-
sages are authenticated as in traditional BFT protocols.
Security Assumption 1. (Honest Shard [1]) The adversary
may create arbitrary smart contracts, and input arbitrary
transactions into Byzcuit, however they are bound to only
control up to f faulty nodes in any shard. As a result, and to
ensure the correctness and liveness properties of Byzantine
consensus, each shard must have a size of at least 3 f + 1
nodes. (From Chainspace [1].)
Any message emitted by shards comes with at least f +1
signatures from nodes. Assuming honest shards, the attacker
can forge at most f signatures, which is not enough to im-
personate a shard.
Security of the first phase of Byzcuit. An attacker may
try to replay pre-accept(T,sT ) and pre-abort(T,sT ) during
the first phase of the protocol, similarly to the attacks de-
scribed in Sections 4.3 and 5.3; the TM then aggregates these
messages into either accept(T,sT ) or abort(T,sT ), and for-
wards them to the shards during the second phase of the pro-
tocol. Theorem 1 shows that Byzcuit detects that they origi-
nate from replayed messages and ignores them.
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Theorem 1. Under Honest Shard assumption, Byzcuit ig-
nores accept(T,sT ) and abort(T,sT ) messages issued from
replayed pre-accept(T,sT ) and pre-abort(T,sT ).
A proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix C.1.
Intuitively, the transaction sequence number sT acts as a
monotonically increasing session identifier associated with
the transaction T ; the attacker cannot obtain prerecorded
messages containing a fresh sT . Byzcuit shards can then dis-
tinguish replayed messages (i.e., messages with old sT ) from
the messages coming from the instance of the protocol that
they are executing (i.e., messages with fresh sT ).
Security of the second phase of Byzcuit. An attacker may
try to replay accept(T,sT ) and abort(T,sT ) messages dur-
ing the second phase of the protocol, similarly to the attacks
described in Sections 4.4 and 5.4; Theorem 2 shows that
Byzcuit ignores those replayed messages.
Theorem 2. Under Honest Shard assumption, Byzcuit ig-
nores replayed accept(T,sT ) and abort(T,sT ) messages.
A proof of Theorem 2 can be found in Appendix C.2. In-
tuitively, these attacks target shards acting only as output
shards (and not also as input shards) and exploit the fact that
they are only involved in the second phase of the protocol,
and therefore have no knowledge of the transaction context
(to determine freshness) that is available to the input shards.
Byzcuit is resilient to these replay attacks as it is designed
in such a way that there are no shards that act only as out-
put shards; all output shards are forced to also become input
shards, by introducing dummy objects if they do not man-
age any input objects; this prevents the attacks as the attack
targets no longer exist.
7 Implementation & Evaluation
We implement a prototype of Byzcuit (Section 6) in Java
and evaluate its performance and scalability. To analyze
the overhead introduced by our replay attack defenses (i.e.,
with message sequence numbers and dummy objects), we
compare Byzcuit with replay defenses (byzcuit) with
the baseline of Byzcuit without any replay attack defenses
(byzcuit-baseline).
Our implementation of Byzcuit is a fork of the Chainspace
code [1], and is released as an open-source project.11 For
BFT consensus, we use the BFT-SMART [3] Java library
(based on PBFT [6]), which is one of the very few main-
tained open source BFT libraries. End users run a client to
communicate with Byzcuit nodes, which sends transactions
according to the BFT-SMART protocol. The Byzcuit client
also acts as the Transaction Manager (TM) and is responsible
for driving the cross-shard consensus.
11https://github.com/sheharbano/byzcuit
We evaluate the performance and scalability of our
Byzcuit implementation through deployments on Amazon
EC2 containers. We launch up to 96 instances for shard
nodes and 96 instances for clients on t2.medium virtual ma-
chines, each containing 8 GB of RAM on 2 virtual CPUs and
running GNU/Linux Debian 8.1. We use 4 nodes per shard.
Each measured data point corresponds to 10 runs represented
by error bars. The error bars in Figure 7 and Figure 8 show
the average and standard deviation, and the error bars in Fig-
ure 9 show the median and the 75th and 25th percentiles.
Throughput and Scalability. Figure 7 shows the through-
put of Byzcuit (the number of transactions processed per sec-
ond, tps) corresponding to an increasing number of shards.
Each transaction has 2 input objects and 5 output objects,
chosen randomly from shards. We test transactions with 5
output objects for a fair evaluation of Byzcuit’s replay de-
fenses by triggering the creation of dummy objects (i.e.,
a large number of output objects and a small number of
input objects implies a higher probability of output-only
shards getting selected, triggering the creation of dummy
objects). We find that byzcuit has a throughput of
260 tps for 2 shards, and linearly scales with the addition
of more shards achieving up to 1550 tps for 10 shards.
As expected, the throughput of byzcuit is lower than
byzcuit-baseline by a somewhat constant factor rang-
ing from 20–200 tps, but still increases linearly. This is ex-
pected because the creation of dummy objects in byzcuit
leads to a higher number of shards processing the same
transaction compared to byzcuit-baseline, leading to
lower concurrency and lower throughput.
Another interesting observation is that the design and
implementation optimizations in byzcuit lead to signifi-
cantly higher throughput than Chainspace, even though the
former has lower concurrency due to the dummy objects. For
similar experimental setup and for 2–10 shards, Chainspace
achieves 70–180 tps, while byzcuit achieves 260–1550
tps. This is due to the improved design of the cross-shard
consensus protocol (Section 6), which results in communi-
cation complexity of O(n) in contrast to Chainspace’s O(n2)
(where n is the number of input shards). Another reason
for byzcuit’s significant throughput improvement is that
unlike Chainspace, all interactions between the Transaction
Manager and the shards are asynchronous. This eliminates
the blocking condition in Chainspace where a shard cannot
commit a transaction in the second phase of the cross-shard
consensus protocol, until it receives messages from all con-
cerned shards corresponding to the first phase.
The Effect of Dummy Objects on Throughput. We pre-
viously observed that the throughput of byzcuit is lower
than byzcuit-baseline due to the creation of dummy
objects to mitigate replay attacks. Figure 8 shows the extent
of throughput degradation due to dummy objects. We sub-
mit specially crafted transactions to 6 shards, such that each
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Figure 7: The effect of the number of shards on transaction throughput.
Each transaction has 2 input objects and 5 output objects, both chosen ran-
domly from shards.
transaction has 1 input object, and we vary the number of
dummy objects from 1–5 selected from unique shards, re-
sulting in a corresponding decrease in concurrency because
as many shards end up processing the transaction. For exam-
ple, 2 dummy objects means that 3 shards process the trans-
action (1 input shard, and 2 more shards corresponding to
the dummy objects). As expected, the throughput decreases
by 20–250 tps with the addition of each dummy object, and
reaches 750 tps when all 6 shards handle all transactions.
Client-perceived Latency. Figure 9 shows the client-
perceived latency—the time from when a client submits a
transaction, until it receives a decision from Byzcuit about
whether the transaction has been committed—under varying
system loads (expressed as transactions submitted to Byzcuit
per second). We submit a total of 1200 transactions at 200–
1000 transactions per second to Byzcuit with 6 shards. Each
transaction has 2 inputs objects and 5 output objects, both
chosen randomly from shards. When the system is experi-
encing a load of up to 1000 tps, clients hear back about their
transactions in less than a second on average, even with our
replay attack defenses.
8 Conclusion
We presented the first replay attacks against cross-shard con-
sensus protocols in sharded distributed ledgers. These at-
tacks affect both shard-driven and client-driven consensus
protocols, and allow attackers to double-spend or lock ob-
jects with minimal efforts. The attacker can act indepen-
dently without colluding with any nodes, and succeed even
if all nodes are honest; most of the attacks work also un-
der asynchrony. While addressing these attacks seems like
an implementation detail, their many variants illustrate that
a fundamental re-think of cross-shard commit protocols is
Figure 8: Decrease of Byzcuit throughput with the number of dummy
objects. Each transaction has 1 input object, and up to 5 dummy objects
randomly selected from unique non-input shards. 6 shards are used.
Figure 9: Client-perceived latency vs. system load (number of trans-
actions received per second by Byzcuit), for 6 shards with 2 inputs and 5
outputs per transaction (both chosen randomly from shards).
required to protect against them.
We developed Byzcuit, a new cross-shard consensus pro-
tocol merging features from shard-led and client-led consen-
sus protocols, and withstanding replay attacks. Byzcuit can
be seen as unifying Atomix (from Omniledger) and S-BAC
(from Chainspace), into an O(n) protocol, that is efficient
and secure. We implemented a prototype of Byzcuit and
evaluated it on a real cloud-based testbed, showing that it
is more performant than Chainspace, and on par with Om-
niledger performance. The resulting protocol is a drop-in
replacement for either, and can be adopted to immunize sys-
tems based on those designs.
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A Comparison with Mutex-based Cross-
shard Consensus Protocols
Mutex-based schemes for cross-shard transactions, such as
Ethereum’s cross-shard “yanking” proposal [4], find a way to
avoid complex cross-shard coordination for transactions that
involve objects managed by different shards. The key idea is
to require all objects that a transaction reads or writes to be
in the same shard (i.e., all locks for a transaction are local to
the shard). Cross-shard transactions are enabled by transfer-
ring the concerned objects between shards, effectively giving
shards a lock on those objects. When shard 1 transfers an
object to shard 2, shard 1 includes a transfer “receipt” in its
blockchain. A client can then send to shard 2 a Merkle proof
of this receipt being included in shard 1’s blockchain, which
makes the object active in shard 2.
Mutex-based schemes also need to consider replay at-
tacks. Clients can claim the same receipt multiple times,
unless shards store information about previously claimed re-
ceipts. Naı¨vely, shards have to store information about all
previously claimed receipts permanently. However, two in-
termediate options with trade-offs have been proposed [4]:
• Shards only store information about receipts for l
blocks; so clients can only claim receipts within l
blocks, and objects are permanently lost if not claimed
within l blocks.
• Shards only store information about receipts for l
blocks, and include the root of a Merkle tree of claimed
receipts in their blockchain every l blocks. If a receipt is
not claimed within l blocks, the client must provide one
Merkle proof every l blocks that have passed to show
that the receipt has not been previously claimed, in or-
der to claim it. The longer the receipt was not claimed,
the greater the number of proofs that are needed to
claim a receipt. These proofs need to be also stored
on-chain to allow other nodes to validate them.
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Byzcuit forgoes the need for shards to store information
about old state (such as inactive objects or old receipts) as
shards only need to know the set of active objects they man-
age, and does not impose a trade-off between the amount
of information about old state that needs to be stored and the
cost of recovering old state that was held up in an incomplete
cross-shard transaction (i.e., an unclaimed receipt).
B Eliciting Messages to Replay
We show how the attacker can act as (or collude with) a client
to actively elicit and record the target messages to later use
in the replay attacks. This empowers the attacker to actively
orchestrate the attacks. We describe how the attacker can
trigger target messages in the context of an example, without
loss of generality. Lets assume that shard 1 manages objects
x1 (‘active’) and object x˜1 (‘inactive’ or non-existent), and
shard 2 manages object x2 (‘active’); x˜∗ means any inactive
object on the shard, and y∗ means any output object (i.e.,
their details do not matter).
B.1 Shard-led Cross-Shard Consensus
We show how the attacker can act as (or collude with) a
client to actively elicit and record the target messages, in
the context of shard-led cross-shard consensus protocols as
illustrated by Section 4. To elicit pre-accept(T ) for a trans-
action T (x1,x2)→ (y∗) (the output y∗ is not relevant here)
from shard 1, the key consideration is to closely precede the
transaction with another transaction T ′ that: (i) locks the in-
puts managed by at least one other shard (in this case x2 on
shard 2); and (ii) to ensure that the preceding transaction T ′
gets ultimately aborted, and x2 becomes active again. The
steps look as follows:
• The attacker submits T ′(x2, x˜∗)→ (y∗) to shard 2. This
locks x2.
• The attacker quickly follows up by submitting
T (x1,x2)→ (y∗) to shard 1 and shard 2. Shard 1 gen-
erates pre-accept(T ), which is the target message that
the attacker records. Shard 2 generates pre-abort(T )
because x2 is locked by T ′. Consequently, in the sec-
ond phase of S-BAC, both shard 1 and shard 2 end up
aborting T .
• T ′ is eventually aborted, making x2 active again.
To elicit pre-abort(T ) for a transaction T (x1,x2)→ (y∗)
(the output y∗ is not relevant here) from shard 1, the key con-
sideration is to closely precede the transaction with another
transaction T ′ that locks the input managed by the shard (in
this case x1 on shard 1). The steps look as follows:
• The attacker submits T ′(x1, x˜∗)→ (y∗) to shard 1. This
locks x1.
• The attacker quickly follows up by submitting
T (x1,x2)→ (y∗) to shard 1 and shard 2. Shard 1 gen-
erates pre-abort(T ) because x1 is locked by T ′, which
is the target message that the attacker records. Shard
2 generates pre-accept(T ). Consequently, in the sec-
ond phase of S-BAC, both shard 1 and shard 2 end up
aborting T .
• T ′ is eventually aborted, making x1 active again.
To elicit accept(T ) used by the attacks described in Sec-
tion 4.4, the attacker simply submits transaction T and ob-
serves and records its successful execution. The attacker has
no incentive to record abort(T ) messages as these are ig-
nored by shards (see Table 2).
B.2 Client-led Cross-Shard Consensus
We show how the attacker can act as (or collude with) a client
to actively elicit and record the target messages, in the con-
text of client-led cross-shard consensus protocols as illus-
trated by Section 5. s To elicit pre-accept(T ) from shard 1
for a transaction T (x1,x2)→ (y∗) (the output y∗ is not rele-
vant here) from shard 1, the key consideration is to closely
precede the transaction with another transaction that: (i) tem-
porarily spends the inputs managed by at least one other
shard (in this case x2 on shard 2); and (ii) to ensure that
the preceding transaction is ultimately aborted so that x2 be-
comes active again. The steps look as follows:
• The attacker submits T ′(x2, x˜∗) → (y∗) to shard 2,
where x˜∗ is managed by a different shard. Shard 2 emits
pre-accept(T ′) and marks x2 as inactive.
• The attacker follows up by submitting T (x1,x2) →
(y∗) to shard 1 and shard 2. Shard 1 generates pre-
accept(T ), which is the target message that the attacker
records. Shard 2 generates pre-abort(T ) because x2 is
inactive.
• The attacker submits abort(T ) to shard 1 to reactivate
x1, and sends abort(T ′) to shard 2 to reactivate x2.
For the attacks described in Section 5.4, the attacker needs
to elicit abort(T ) and accept(T ) from the target shards. For
the former, the attacker can follow the steps described pre-
viously to elicit pre-accept(T ) and pre-abort(T ). To elicit
accept(T ), the attacker simply submits transaction T and
observes and records its successful execution.
C Proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2
The security proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 of Sec-
tion 6.2 rely on Lemma 1.
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Lemma 1. Under Honest Shard assumption, no attacker can
obtain prerecorded messages containing a fresh transaction
sequence number sT .
Proof. The core idea protecting Byzcuit from these replay
attacks is that the attacker can only obtain prerecorded mes-
sages associated with old transaction sequence numbers sT .
The transaction sequence number sT is fresh only if it is at
least equal the maximum of the sequence number of all in-
put and dummy objects of the transaction T . Shards update
every input and dummy object sequence number upon abort-
ing transactions in such a way that sequence numbers only
increase. That is, after emitting pre-accept(T,sT ) or pre-
abort(T,sT ), either the sequence number of all input and
dummy objects of T are updated to a value bigger than sT
(in case of pre-abort(T,sT )), or the objects are inactivated
which prevents any successive transaction to use them as in-
put (in case of pre-accept(T,sT )). It is therefore impossible
for the adversary to hold a prerecorded message for a fresh
sT since the only prerecorded messages that the adversary
can obtain contain sequence numbers smaller than sT .
C.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. Under Honest Shard assumption, Byzcuit ig-
nores accept(T,sT ) and abort(T,sT ) messages issued from
replayed pre-accept(T,sT ) and pre-abort(T,sT ).
Proof. Figure 6 shows that once Byzcuit locks objects for a
particular pair (T,sT ), the protocol can only progress toward
accept(T,sT ) or abort(T,sT ); i.e. shards can either accept
or abort the transaction T . The attacker aims to trick one
or more shards to incorrectly accept or abort T by injecting
prerecorded messages during the first phase of Byzcuit; we
show that the attacker fails in every possible scenario.
Suppose transaction T should abort (the TM outputs
abort(T,sT )), but the attacker tries to trick some shards to
accept the transaction. Figure 6 shows that the attacker can
only succeed the attack if they gather accept(T,sT ) contain-
ing a fresh transaction sequence number sT . Lemma 1 states
that no attacker can obtain prerecorded messages over fresh
transaction sequence number sT ; therefore the only messages
available to the adversary at this point of the protocol are (at
most) n−1 pre-accept(T,sT ) and (at most) n abort(T,sT ),
where n is the number of concerned shards. This is not
enough to form an accept(T,sT ) message with a fresh trans-
action sequence number sT (which is composed of n pre-
accept(T,sT )); therefore the attacker cannot trick any shard
to accept the transaction.
Suppose transaction T should be accepted (the TM out-
puts accept(T,sT ) with a fresh ST ), but the attacker tries
to trick some shards to abort the transaction. Figure 6
show that Byzcuit does not require a fresh transaction se-
quence number sT to abort transactions (the freshness of sT
is only enforced upon accepting a transaction); but shards
locked the input and dummy objects of the transaction for
the pair (T,sT ) (with fresh sT ), so the attacker needs to gather
abort(T,sT ) containing the same transaction sequence num-
ber sT locked by shards. Lemma 1 shows that the attacker
cannot obtain prerecorded messages over fresh sT ; there-
fore the only messages available to the adversary contain-
ing the (fresh) sT locked by shards at this point of the pro-
tocol are n pre-accept(T,sT ). This is not enough to form
an abort(T,sT ) message (which is composed of at least one
pre-abort(T,sT )); therefore the attacker cannot trick any
shard to abort the transaction.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. Under Honest Shard assumption, Byzcuit ig-
nores replayed accept(T,sT ) and abort(T,sT ) messages.
Proof. Figure 6 shows that shards only act upon ac-
cept(T,sT ) and abort(T,sT ) messages if they have the pair
(T,sT ) saved in their local cache12. Shards save a pair (T,sT )
in their local cache upon emitting pre-accept(T,sT ) or pre-
abort(T,sT ), and delete it at the end of the protocol; there-
fore the only attack windows where the adversary can replay
accept(T,sT ) and abort(T,sT ) messages is while the trans-
action T (associated with sT ) is being processed by the sec-
ond phase of Byzcuit. This forces the attacker to operates
under the same conditions as Theorem 1, which is proven
secure in Appendix C.1.
D Security & Correctness of Byzcuit
We show that Byzcuit guarantees liveness, consistency, and
validity similarly to S-BAC.
Theorem 3. (Liveness [1]) Under Honest Shards assump-
tion, a transaction T that is proposed to at least one honest
concerned node, eventually results in either being commit-
ted or aborted, namely all parties deciding accept(T,sT ) or
abort(T,sT ). (From Chainspace [1].)
Proof. We rely on the liveness properties of the byzantine
agreement (shards with only f nodes eventually reach con-
sensus on a sequence), and the broadcast from nodes of
shards to all other nodes of shards, channelled through the
Transaction Manager. Assuming T has been given to an hon-
est node, it will be sequenced withing an honest shard BFT
sequence, and thus a pre-accept(T,sT ) or pre-abort(T,sT )
will be sent from the 2 f + 1 honest nodes of this shard, ag-
gregated into accept(T,sT ) or abort(T,sT ), and sent to the
f + 1 nodes of the other concerned shards. Upon receiving
these messages the honest nodes from other shards will pro-
cess the transaction within their shards, and the BFT will
12Contrarily to S-BAC and Atomix, all Byzcuit shards have the pair
(T,sT ) in their local cache after as they all participate to the first phase
of the protocol.
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eventually sequence it. Thus the user will eventually receive
a decision from at least f +1 nodes of a shard.
Theorem 4. (Consistency [1]) Under Honest Shards as-
sumption, no two conflicting transactions, namely transac-
tions sharing the same input will be committed. Further-
more, a sequential executions for all transactions exists.
(From Chainspace [1].)
Proof. A transaction is accepted only if some nodes receive
accept(T,sT ), which presupposes all shards have provided
enough evidence to conclude pre-accept(T,sT ) for each of
them. Two conflicting transaction, sharing an input, must
share a shard of at least 3 f +1 concerned nodes for the com-
mon object—with at most f of them being malicious. With-
out loss of generality upon receiving the pre-accept(T,sT )
message for the first transaction, this shard will sequence it,
and the honest nodes will emit messages for all—and will
lock this object until the two phase protocol concludes. Any
subsequent attempt to pre-accept(T,sT ) for a conflicting T ′
will result in a pre-abort(T,sT ) and cannot yield a accept,
if all other shards are honest majority too. After comple-
tion of the first accept(T,sT ) the shard removes the object
from the active set, and thus subsequent T ′ would also lead
to pre-abort(T,sT ). Thus there is no path in the chain of
possible interleavings of the executions of two conflicting
transactions that leads to them both being committed.
Theorem 5. (Validity [1]) Under Honest Shards assump-
tion, a transaction may only be accepted if it is valid ac-
cording to the smart contract (or application) logic. (From
Chainspace [1].)
Proof. A transaction is committed only if some nodes con-
clude that accept(T,sT ), which presupposes all shards have
provided enough evidence to conclude pre-accept(T,sT ) for
each of them. The concerned nodes include at least one shard
per input object for the transaction; for any contract logic
represented in the transaction, at least one of those shards
will be managing object from that contract. Each shard
checks the validity rules for the objects they manage (ensur-
ing they are active) and the contracts those objects are part of
(ensuring the transaction is valid with respect to the contract
logic) in order to pre-accept(T,sT ). Thus if all shards say
pre-accept(T,sT ) to conclude that accept(T,sT ), all object
have been checked as active, and all the contract calls within
the transaction have been checked by at least one shard—
whose decision is honest due to at most f faulty nodes. If
even a single object is inactive or locked, or a single trace
for a contract fails to check, then the honest nodes in the
shard will emit pre-abort(T,sT ), and the final decision will
be abort(T,sT ).
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